



The last fifteen years have seen an almost incredi-
ble increase in the speed at which funds move through
the economy. Central to this change has been the
continual development of electronic funds transfer
(EFT) networks. Although few would deny the
benefits of the increasing facility with which trans-
actions can take place, this progress has not come
without cost. Specifically, there has been increasing
concern with the risk exposure faced by participants
in the payments system, particularly with regard to
large dollar transfers that incur overdrafts.
1 Along
with this concern have come proposals to deal with
this exposure.
On an average day in 1984, over $640 billion was
transferred by way of EFT networks. Given the
interdependence that exists between participants in
these networks, it is possible that losses in the event
of the sudden failure of an institution could be huge.
At the same time, however, such a failure is highly
unlikely, and has not in fact occurred. Thus, it is
possible for reasonable men to disagree on both the
magnitude of the problem created by overdrafts and
what to do about them.
The object of this article is to consider, in economic
terms, the nature of risks on EFT networks and the
desirability of specific measures proposed to deal
with these risks. With regard to the former, a simple
economic framework will be developed in Section II
in order to analyze risks by EFT participants. With
regard to the latter, Section III will describe and
evaluate the various policy alternatives that have been
advanced. The following questions will be implicit
in the discussion of risk reduction measures:
l How will a risk reduction policy affect risk
assignment?
l What incentives will the policy create among
participants?
* Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
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(1984).
l Are the incentives created by the risk assign-
ments likely to accomplish the policy’s objec-
tive of reducing excessive risk taking ?
Particular attention will be given to pricing as a risk
reduction policy and to the importance of the lender
of last resort to the problem of risk on private net-
works. This discussion will be followed by a descrip-
tion of policies adopted by the Board of Governors in
May 1985.
Since EFT systems are complex entities that are
little known outside the banking industry, Section I
will describe the major wholesale EFT networks and
explain the nature of the overdraft problem. Readers
who are familiar with EFT systems and daylight
overdrafts may wish to skip the first section and go
directly to the analytical material beginning with
Section II.
I.
A PRIMER ON EFT NETWORKS AND
DAYLIGHT OVERDRAFTS
Types of Networks
Generally, wholesale EFT systems are designed to
transfer funds between banks
2 in order to permit a
customer (the “sender”) of the sending bank to
make a payment to a customer (the “receiver”) of
the receiving bank, or else to be used for payments
between banks. In contrast, retail systems, such as
automated clearinghouses or automated teller ma-
chine networks, are primarily, but not exclusively,
concerned with consumer payments. Wholesale wire
transfer systems may simply take the form of com-
munications networks that convey instructions to the
receiving bank to debit the sending bank’s corre-
spondent account and to credit the receiver’s account.
If the two banks do not have a correspondent rela-
tionship, the sending bank may instruct a third bank
2 
Throughout this article, “bank” will be used to refer to
any depository institution authorized to use EFT
services.
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receiving banks to debit the sending bank and credit
the receiving bank for the amount of the transfer.
These networks, of which BankWire and Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications
(SWIFT) are examples, have in common the char-
acteristic that they do not themselves provide settle-
ment services, that is, they do not include any mech-
anisms for consolidating or centralizing transactions
between participating banks in order to determine
the banks’ financial positions in relation to each other.
As a result, wire transfers on nonsettling networks
are essentially bilateral exchanges.
Adding settlement services to a network char-
acterized by bilateral transfers yields a  gross settle-
ment  mechanism, in which each transaction is settled
when made. Because such a network uses a common
set of accounts, such as reserve accounts, to determine
relative financial positions, the receiving bank saves
the costs associated with maintaining and posting
entries to correspondent balances. In addition, since
settlement occurs immediately, the receiver could
have immediate access to “good” funds.
If all transactions between banks were conducted
on a bilateral basis, however, increasing numbers of
banks and customers in an economy would mean
increasing costs due to the sheer increase in volume
of transactions that must be handled separately. In
order to reduce such costs, participants in payments
systems have incentives to reduce costs by consoli-
dating transactions into net debit and credit positions,
thereby reducing the number of actual interbank
transfers taking place. Specifically,  net settlement,
in which transactions taking place within a specified
period are consolidated into net debits or credits for
each settling institution, allows each participant to
greatly reduce the number of payments and receipts
it must make per period. This can in turn take two
shapes : in its simplest form, net settlement means
that each pair of institutions comprising a payments
network would net final bilateral positions at the end
of, say, a day, and then arrange payment. Although
this would involve a payment or receipt each day
between a bank and all others with which it deals, it
does create economies by eliminating the necessity
for funds to change hands with each separate cus-
tomer transfer. Further economies may be gained by
instituting “net-net” settlement, in which the settling
organization maintains a central network account,
and collects or distributes each institution’s position
vis-à-vis the settling organization at the end of each
period. As a result, each participant makes only one
payment or receipt per period. Because all existing
net settlement EFT networks use the latter form, net
settlement will be understood to mean net-net settle-
ment in the remainder of this article.
Both gross and net settlement have their own
unique advantages. On one hand, gross settlement
provides immediate transfer and availability of funds.
On the other hand, net settlement has  the greater
potential for cost reductions due to the consolidation
of payments and receipts. It is possible, therefore,
for both types of systems to exist side by side. When
choosing between systems for a particular transfer, a
bank would consider the importance of immediate
availability relative to other cost savings.
Large Dollar Wire Transfer Networks
Fedwire.  The primary wholesale EFT network in
the United States today is Fedwire, operated by the
Federal Reserve System. This system, the first na-
tional settling network, has existed in various forms
since 1918.
3 Settlement originally took place between
the twelve regional banks by means of the Gold
Settlement Account maintained at the Treasury, and
today is accomplished through the Fed’s Interdistrict
Settlement Fund. Fedwire uses a gross settlement
mechanism since, as will be shown, transfers between
participants are essentially bilateral, making use of
transfers between reserve accounts maintained at the
regional Federal Reserve Banks by the participants.
A transaction on Fedwire may take place as fol-
lows. A sender, who may be an individual or a
private or governmental organization, requests a bank
to transfer funds to a receiver. The sending bank
debits the sender’s account, and requests its regional
Federal Reserve Bank to send a transfer message to
the Reserve Bank serving the receiver’s bank. Banks
may be directly connected “on line” by computer
with the Fedwire system, or may use telephone or an
ad hoc computer link to make contact with their
Reserve Bank. The sending bank’s Reserve Bank
debits the sending bank’s reserve account for the
amount of the transfer, and credits the receiving
bank’s Reserve Bank for that same amount. The
receiving Reserve Bank debits the sending Reserve
Bank’s account, and credits the receiving bank’s
reserve account for the transfer. Finally, the re-
ceiving bank notifies the recipient of the transfer,
and the receiver is immediately free to use the funds.
This last point deserves emphasis. Fedwire trans-
fers are final in that “irrevocable credit will promptly
3 
For a description of payments mechanisms that evolved
before the Fed, see John R. Walter (1984).
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customers receiving payments.“
4 In other words, the
receiver may assume he has “good” funds as soon as
he is advised that a transfer has been made. Once
made, a transaction cannot be revoked. Further, if
the transfer takes place without sufficient funds being
provided by the sender, the Fed assumes the risk.
Thus, an attractive feature of Fedwire is the certainty
it provides to receivers.
5
Although Fedwire services were originally offered
only to Federal Reserve member banks and were not
charged for, the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA)
instituted pricing of transfers and gave nonmember
banks direct access to Fedwire. The Fedwire system
has the highest number of transactions of any wire
transfer network. Because the Federal funds market
works through Fedwire, and immediately good funds
are desired in the money market, there is a con-
tinuing high demand for such a gross settlement
network. In 1984, approximately 166,410 transfers
took place on Fedwire on an average day, with an
average transfer size of $2.2 million each. Average
daily dollar volume was approximately $366 billion.
CHIPS.  The second largest wholesale EFT sys-
tem is the Clearing House Interbank Payments Sys-
tem (CHIPS), set up in 1970 by the New York
Clearing House Association. The original purpose
of the network was to clear international transactions
of member banks, but it now accommodates domestic
transactions as well. Settlement through CHIPS
takes place on a net-net basis, and is conducted by a
subset of participants known as settling banks. Ap-
proximately 138 banks participate in CHIPS, of
which 21 are settling banks. Of the remainder, about
two-thirds are branches of foreign banks.
A typical transaction may take place as follows. A
transfer may be initiated between 7 a.m. and 4:30
p.m. (New York time), during which period payment
information messages are sent from the sending bank,
through the CHIPS computer, to the receiving bank.
The computer in turn notifies the settling banks who
have agreed to settle for the sending and receiving
banks. This information is posted to the accounts
of the participating banks, but no settlement takes
4 
49 Fed. Reg. 13190.
5 
Transfers are certain due to a combination for finality
(Regulation J, Subpart B, 12 C.F.R. $210.36) and the
provision that the Fed will have a security interest in the
sending bank, not in the receiving bank or receiver, if an
overdraft is not covered by the end of the day (12 C.F.R.
§ 210.31).
place until after close of business. In other words,
funds transfers are provisional until settlement at the
end of the day.
After 4:30, the computer provides a list of net
credit and debit positions of the settling banks vis-à-
vis the CHIPS system and the position of the non-
settling banks against their settling banks. By 4:45,
this information should be provided to participants.
Once this becomes available, the settling banks may
notify nonsettling banks of their net positions. As
soon as all settling banks agree to settle, those in a
net debit position with CHIPS send payment,
through Fedwire, to the CHIPS account at the New
York Fed. Then, assuming all net debtors have
settled, payment is made to settling banks in a net
credit position with CHIPS by 6:00. At this time,
the CHIPS account should be back to a zero balance,
and all that remains are payments between settling
and nonsettling banks. Because Fedwire is used for
settlement within the CHIPS system, all net transfers
are final and there is certainty of the validity of the
transfers on the part of participating banks.
Finality of payment does not exist on CHIPS in
the same sense as it does on Fedwire. CHIPS trans-
fers are irrevocable on the part of the sending bank,
that is, once sent, a payment remains an obligation of
the sending bank and cannot be cancelled. Unlike
Fedwire, however, the receiver’s account need  not be
credited until final settlement at the end of the day,
although the receiving bank is allowed to give
immediate credit if it so desires. Thus, transfers are
provisional rather than final until settlement occurs.
CHIPS has a smaller number of transactions than
does Fedwire, but a higher average transaction size.
For example, in 1984, almost 23 million transactions
took place at an average rate of over 91,000 transfers
per day. Average daily dollar volume was approxi-
mately $276.5 billion, and mean transaction size was
over $3 million.
CashWire.  The third settlement network used in
the United States is CashWire, which began full
operations on April 1, 1952. This was developed as a
settling network from BankWire which, as pointed
out above, is a nonsettling network used to exchange
payments information and to effect transfers of corre-
spondent balances.
CashWire is a net-net settlement system, and a
typical transaction occurs as follows. After a sender
notifies his bank that he wishes to make a transfer,
the bank transmits the payments information to the
BankWire computer, and the information is passed
through immediately to the receiving bank. At 4:30
16 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1985p.m. no more transactions are accepted, and a sum-
mary of net debit and credit positions is provided to
the banks and to the New York Fed. Fedwire is
then used by net debtor banks to send funds owed to
the CashWire account at the New York Fed. After
debit payments are received, Fedwire is again used
to remit funds to banks in net credit positions, the
CashWire account balance returns to zero, and pay-
ment is final.
CashWire has been characterized as providing
finality of payment in that receiving banks, in the
event of settlement failure, cannot take back funds
that have been made available to receivers.
6 Actually,
transfers are apparently provisional to receivers until
net settlement, so finality on CashWire does not
exist for receivers any more than it does on CHIPS.
The closest CashWire comes to finality is its “re-
ceiver guarantee,” according to which banks must
make good the amount by which a failed sending bank
is unable to meet its net debit position. Specifically,
each of the failed bank’s creditors is required to make
up the shortfall by an amount proportional to its
share of the sum of all net credits extended on Cash-
Wire to the failed sending bank. This shortfall could
be made up from creditor banks’ liquid assets, but
nothing in the CashWire rules prohibits financing by
revoking funds that had been provisionally granted
to receivers. Thus, although finality may exist for
receiving banks in that a settlement, once computed,
will not be cancelled or unwound, it does not exist
for receivers until final settlement.
Cash Wire volume is small compared to Fedwire
and CHIPS, and daily volume as of August 1984
was only $500 million, consisting of 1,100 transac-
tions per day on average.
7 Participation has also
fallen short of expectations.
8 As of Summer 1984,
out of 170 BankWire participants, only 22 were
members of CashWire as well.
Other wholesale networks. In addition to the
foregoing, the Chicago Clearing House Association
operates the Clearing House Electronic Settlement
System (CHESS), which is open to institutions in
the Seventh (Chicago) Federal Reserve District.
The most recent addition to the list of networks is
the California Bankers’ Clearing House Association’s
Twelfth District Electronic Settlement System
(TESS) network for California banks in the San
6 
See, for example, 49 Fed. Reg. 13190 and Stevens
(1984), p. 6.
7 
American Banker, August 28, 1984.
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American Banker, August 9, 1984.
Francisco Federal Reserve District. In Canada, the
Canadian Payments Association operates a system
that uses net-net settlement through the Bank of
Canada, while in England the Clearing House Auto-
mated Payments System (CHAPS) acts as a settling
network for a set of United Kingdom clearing banks.
Daylight Overdrafts
The major controversy regarding EFT networks
concerns the risk exposure of the payments system
due to the existence of daylight overdrafts. These
occur when payment is made during the course of a
business day before the transaction is covered with
“good” funds. In other words, at least one of the
institutions involved extends free credit that will be
repaid before the end of the day.
Daylight overdrafts on gross settlement networks
are  not identical to those on net settlement networks.
On net settlement systems, overdrafts are of an am-
biguous nature. Since participants on such systems
do not settle until the end of the day, the only over-
drafts (in the strict sense) that occur are, first, be-
tween a sender who has not yet provided funds to
cover a transfer and a sending bank that allows that
transfer to go ahead immediately ; and, second, be-
tween a receiver and a receiving bank that allows the
receiver to use funds before settlement occurs. Both
of these may be thought of as normal credit judg-
ments which banks are called upon to make. One
possible definition of a daylight overdraft on a net
settlement network, then, is the extent to which re-
ceivers have been allowed to draw on provisional
transfers. Another possible definition is the amount
by which a bank’s net debit position across all net-
works exceeds its reserve account balance with its
Federal Reserve Bank.
9 In actual policy discussions,
however,  daylight overdrafts on the private networks
are assumed to occur whenever a bank is in a net
debit position, regardless of reserve account balance.
Thus, by this definition, daylight overdrafts are an
inescapable result of the nature of a net settlement
system, in which at least one participant must be a
net debtor.
On a gross settlement network such as Fedwire, a
daylight overdraft has a more straightforward defi-
nition. Specifically, it refers to a transfer that has
been made and becomes final even though the sending
bank’s reserve account did not contain sufficient
9 
The Canadian Payments Association uses a definition
similar to this on its net settlement network. If an
institution’s net debit exceeds its clearing balance, it
receives an advance from the Bank of Canada which
must be paid back with interest.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 17funds for the transfer at the time it was made. Alter-
natively stated, the sending bank’s reserve account
balance has gone negative.
On Fedwire, daylight overdrafts occur due to the
way in which Regulation J, Subpart B is written.
One section states that payment is final once the
receiving Reserve Bank sends it to the receiving bank
or else notifies the receiver of the credit. In addition,
this section makes it clear that finality means that the
receiver has the right to immediate use of the funds.
10
Another section requires a sending bank to have
sufficient funds in its reserve account  at the end of
the day  to cover net debits for that day.
11 Thus, by
granting immediate use of transferred funds while
giving until the end of the day to cover debit posi-
tions, the opportunity for, as well as legality of, day-
light overdrafts arises. Interestingly, the same sec-
tion that gives the sending bank until the end of the
day to provide cover also empowers a Reserve Bank
to “refuse to act on” a transfer that “it has reason
to believe” may incur an overdraft, so that overdrafts
are apparently both permitted and frowned upon.
12
It is not entirely clear how the regulation came to
be written so as to permit daylight overdrafts. Such
overdrafts probably occurred under the pre-1971
Fedwire system, which relied on manual accounting
and teletype notification of transfers. Since Reserve
Banks normally could not provide immediate infor-
mation as to the current intraday status of a bank’s
reserve account, it is probable that wire transfers
took place before it was known that a sending bank
had sufficient covering funds in its reserve account.
During this period, there were no systemwide regu-
lations specifically covering wire transfers, and any
rules that existed were contained in individual Re-
serve Bank operating circulars. Thus, it may be
argued that Regulation J, when it was finally re-
written to include wire transfers, simply formalized
what had already been taking place. However, when
the Board of Governors first proposed that Regula-
tion J be revised to cover wire transfers, the relevant
section permitted transfers subject to the restriction
that “each transferer shall maintain . . . a daily net
balance sufficient to cover the transfers of funds
debited to its account.“
13 Given this language, it is
10 
1.2 C.F.R. § 210.36.
11 
12 C.F.R. § 210.31.
12 
Banks are not permitted to run overnight overdrafts,
and violators are subject to a penalty rate. See Regu-
lation D, 12 C.F.R. § 204.7 and various Reserve Bank
operating circulars.
13 
38 Fed. Reg. 32954 (1973).
not clear whether daylight overdrafts were to be
permitted or not. This was changed to the present
policy in the 1976 proposal, and the reason given was
“to clarify the amount of the balance which a member
bank must hold with its Federal Reserve Bank.“
14
Indeed, given the technology in place at that time,
daylight overdrafts most likely could not have been
effectively controlled without major costly changes to
the system. In addition, reserve balances at that
time were higher than they have been since the
Monetary Control Act of 1980 imposed universal, but
lower, reserve requirements.
Once daylight overdrafts are permitted on a gross
settlement network, the distinction between a gross
and net settlement system begins to break down.
Although Fedwire’s transfers are final when made
while those on the other systems are not, sending
banks incurring overdrafts on Fedwire are allowed
to settle on a basis similar to that found on the private
networks. The distinction would be even less signifi-
cant if participants in the networks were to grant
immediate irrevocable credit to their receivers.
II.
RISK AND WHOLESALE PAYMENTS NETWORKS
Risk Concepts
In order to gain some insights into the economic
aspects of payments system risks, assume there exists
a simple settlement network for banks in an economy
which permits overdraft transfers subject to their
being repaid by the end of the day, but does not guar-
antee that settlement will take place and does not
provide for finality of payment. This network may
use either gross or net settlement via a central set of
accounts. Banks undertake transfers for the benefit
of third parties (senders and receivers), and are
compensated by fees net of operating costs.
15 Finally,
all payments are risky, that is, it is uncertain whether
or not an overdraft transfer will be covered. This
uncertainty means that costs may be borne by partici-
pants in the payments system. Such costs, known as
expected costs, are determined by multiplying the
magnitude of loss and the probability of such a loss
occurring.
Credit risk arises from uncertainty that funds
credited will actually be received, and is faced as a
14 
41 Fed. Reg. 3098 (1976).
15 
For a model that emphasizes the jointness of both
costs and benefits on payments systems, see William F.
Baxter (1983).
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banks and the receiver. This may in turn be broken
down into sender risk and receiver risk. In terms of
the simple payments system described above, sender
risk refers to the fact that a sending bank faces an
expected loss whenever it extends overdraft credit
to a sender. In other words, it is the risk that the
sender will not provide covering funds and is by no
means unique to EFT systems. At the other end of
the transaction, the receiving bank faces receiver
risk, which arises due to uncertainty whether or not a
sending bank will settle.
16 In addition, if the receiv-
ing bank were to allow the receiver to draw on
provisionally transferred funds, the receiver also faces
expected costs due to the possibility that his bank
may attempt to revoke his funds in the event of
settlement failure.
Systemic risk refers to the expectation that fail-
ure of one bank to settle will cause another bank or
banks to fail to settle as well. This would arise if,
within a particular bank, ability to settle debit posi-
tions depends on receipt of credits. Default of a
particularly large net credit (in relation to total liquid
assets) may keep a bank from meeting its obligations
to other banks against which it is in a net debit posi-
tion. In turn,  this failure could conceivably cause
settlement failures at other banks who depend on
credits from the receiving bank to meet their debit
positions, and so on. Thus, systemic risk refers to
expected costs that are not borne solely by the in-
curring bank but by other participants in a payments
network as well. In other words, a receiving bank
that accepts a transfer and allows a receiver to draw
funds before settlement incurs not only private costs
due to credit risk but also external costs that are
borne as receiver risk by other banks in the system.
These latter costs, known as externalities, may not be
borne exclusively by the receiving bank’s creditor
banks, but also by banks to whom these creditors are
in overdraft positions. Thus, in accepting a transfer,
a receiving bank can be expected to take into account
its private credit risks but not these additional social
costs. The end result in the simplified payments
system is an incentive for receiving banks to accept
riskier transfers than would be the case if these banks
were to bear all their costs privately.
The distinction between private and external costs
is important for the following reason. Since receiver
risk is borne privately by a receiving bank, this bank
may be expected to have incentives to keep such costs
16 
Stevens (1984) combines sender and receiver risk into
settlement risk.
to a minimum. Specifically, a bank may wish to
control its exposure to sending banks it has reason
to believe may default on credit positions. However,
systemic risk is borne by other banks in the system,
so that this same bank may not have incentives to
limit risks to which it exposes other banks. In other
words, there is little reason to expect this bank to
place as much emphasis on controlling its net debit
position against the rest of the system as it would
place on controlling its exposure as a creditor to
other banks.
In this simple system, it should make little differ-
ence for risk purposes whether a network uses net or
gross settlement. Under the former, sender risk
would exist until an overdraft is covered, while re-
ceiver risk would exist until final settlement. Under
the latter, both sender and receiver risk would exist
until the overdraft is covered. Assuming all such
transactions under either system must be covered by
the end of the day, potential risk on net settlement
networks is the upper limit for that on gross settle-
ment networks.
Risk Assignment Under Varying
Institutional Structures
Both CHIPS and CashWire have some similarities
to the hypothetical payments system described above.
There is no finality for receivers, nor is there explicit
guarantee of settlement to receiving banks. Thus, all
the risks found in the hypothetical model are also
found in the private networks. Sender risk exists for
those banks sending transfers for customers who have
not provided cover at the time of transfer. Receiver
risk exists until final net settlement occurs at the end
of the day. If the receiving bank allows a receiver to
draw funds before settlement, it is exposed to risk
even though the receiving bank may try to recover
the funds from the receiver. In other words, there
is no finality of payment to receivers until final net
settlement. Thus, receiver risk is borne by both
receiving bank and receiver. Less directly, the sender
may also be at risk because, if a receiving bank suc-
cessfully recovers funds from a receiver after failure
of a sending bank, the receiver may have cause for
action to recover payment from the sender. In turn,
this sender may have already supplied funds to the
failed bank.
Systemic risk is present on this simplified version
of the private networks because a bank may depend
on a credit from a failing bank to pay other banks
against which it is in a net debit position. If a
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 19CHIPS member fails to settle, and no other bank
will settle for that member, all debit and credit mes-
sages for this sender may be cancelled and a new
settlement computed. Systemic risk arises here be-
cause of possible dependence of other banks on credits
from the failed bank. The cancellation of the mes-
sages does not relieve the failing bank of obligation
to ultimately settle because CHIPS transfers, once
sent, are irreversible. However, this does not affect
systemic risk since it is highly improbable that funds
could be recovered during whatever remains of the
day before settlement. On CashWire, as noted above,
losses are apportioned among creditors. Although
this does not by itself eliminate systemic risk, it does
appear to localize problems.
17
Adding finality of payment, under which immedi-
ate and irrevocable credit is granted to receivers, to
the hypothetical system varies the risk assignment
somewhat. Sender risk does not change, but receiver
risk, which was previously shared by the receiver
and the receiving bank, is narrowed to the receiving
bank. One would expect this new risk assignment
to lead to incentives on the part of receiving banks to
monitor the soundness of sending banks from which
they receive transfers. At the same time, receivers
(and, as will be shown, senders), will have fewer
incentives to monitor sending banks.
Adding guarantee of settlement to finality adds an
additional party, the insurer, to the hypothetical pay-
ments system model, thereby approximating the risk
assignment on Fedwire. Finality removes risk from
the receiver, thereby confining receiver risk to the
receiving bank. However, the Fed, as insurer, guar-
antees that settlement will occur, that is, that the
overdraft will be covered. In the event of settlement
failure, the Fed has recourse to the failing bank,
18
although the amount eventually recovered is uncer-
tain. Thus, receiver risk is assumed by the Fed and
consists of expected losses net of amounts expected
to be recovered from the bank that failed to settle.
Because any loss would reduce Fed net revenues
available for transfer to the United States Treasury,
the risk is ultimately borne by the public. Sender
risk on Fedwire does exist, and may be borne by
the sending bank and the Fed. However, since
receiver risk is shifted from the receiving bank to the
public, failure to settle is localized and will not affect
17 
Nothing in the CHIPS rules appears to preclude the
New York Clearing House Committee from dealing with




the position of any other bank. Still, it is important
to emphasize that no receiver risk has been elimi-
nated; rather, it has simply been socialized.
The question of what happens to systemic risk is
more complex. If banks no longer face receiver risk,
they cannot face systemic risk so, at first blush, it
appears that systemic risk has been eliminated. Cer-
tainly the externality has not been placed on the
participating banks, since banks are not made to take
these costs into account when choosing whether to
accept a transfer. However, from the point of view
of the insurer, that is, the Fed, systemic risk is some-
one’s receiver risk. This is analogous to the fact that
externalities are the sum of private costs borne by
individuals other than those incurring them. For
example, when a factory causes pollution, it inflicts
costs on nearby landowners. The sum of these costs
is the externality incurred by the polluter. If the
factory owner is made to compensate the surrounding
landowners for the pollution he has caused, all the
pollution costs are turned into private costs to the
polluter. Similarly, the total risk assumed by the
insurer is the sum of receiver risks in the system,
and in assuming all receiver risks the Fed has thereby
assumed systemic risk as well.
Insurance of receiver risks in the Fedwire system
means that, other things equal, costs faced by banks
when exchanging payments messages are lower than
they would otherwise be without insurance. As a
result, supply of messages is increased. In other
words, since banks need no longer concern themselves
with receiver risk, they may tend to accept transfers
from sending banks who may have been turned down
if no insurance had been provided. Thus, the Fed
provides a valuable service to each bank by assuming
receiver risks. Since the Fed’s insurance is provided
at zero price, banks have little incentive to reduce
exposure to overdraft transfers.
It may also be argued that the Fed also provides
implicit insurance on the private networks through its
role as lender of last resort. According to this line
of reasoning, the Fed would never sit back and allow
systemic failure, and would surely step in by lending
to banks in net credit positions with a failed bank in
order to contain the effects of any settlement failure.
If this is indeed the case, then the final assignment
of costs depends on what happens to the receiving
banks affected by a sending bank’s failure. Here, it
is important to distinguish between illiquidity and in-
solvency.
If a receiving bank’s problem is insufficient liquid
assets to make up the sending bank’s shortfall, dis-
count window lending to the receiving bank in order
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diate effect of eliminating systemic risk. However,
since the receiving bank would have to pay back the
loan plus interest to the Fed, that bank would end up
bearing the receiver risk net of any amounts eventu-
ally recovered from the failed sending bank. Further,
the Fed will be compensated for the credit it has
extended to prevent failure. Finally, the externality
cost will be placed on the borrowing bank, since by
averting failure due to illiquidity, the borrower is
prevented from passing costs on to its creditor banks.
Thus, if failure of one participant in a system causes
liquidity problems for its creditors, discount window
lending to the failed bank’s creditors will both prevent
systemic failure and assign costs to receiving banks
and receivers. This in turn would increase incentives
to monitor sending banks.
Insolvency presents a more complex set of circum-
stances. If a bank in a net debit position fails without
warning before net settlement occurs, it is possible
that one or more receiving banks may eventually
become insolvent as a result. In this case, the assign-
ment of costs will depend on to whom the Fed lends.
If the Fed advances credit to the failing receiving
banks in order to allow settlement to proceed, then
the costs will ultimately be borne by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation fund and the public.
In this case, the external costs are not placed on the
failed banks, although the discount rate represents a
price of the Fed’s assuming the risk of having to bear
these costs. If the Fed only advances credit to banks
experiencing liquidity problems as a result of some
receiving banks failing, then the assignment of costs
is identical to that described in the previous para-
graph.
It is important to emphasize that the preceding
analysis depends on the assumption that the Fed
lends to receiving banks in net credit positions with
the failing bank. If, on the other hand, discount
window advances were made to the failing bank
simply to allow settlement to proceed, costs would,
as in the case of insolvency, be shifted to the FDIC
and public and not to the receiving banks. In this
case, as with Fedwire, receiving banks would have
little incentive to monitor sending banks. Thus,
banks’ incentives to control risk exposures may be
related to their perceptions of to whom the Fed is
likely to lend in the event of settlement failure.
To sum up, the crucial difference between risk
assignment on Fedwire and that on the private net-
works stems from the manner in which transfers are
guaranteed. On Fedwire, losses due to failure to
settle are borne by the public free of charge. There-
fore, since sending banks are not made to take ac-
count of external costs involved in making transfers,
there is an oversupply of transfers. On the private
networks, however, risks are placed on receiving
banks because banks will have to repay the lender of
last resort the amounts borrowed to cover a sending
bank’s failure to settle. Since interest is charged for
this lending, the externality should be passed back to
the banking system, and should be faced as a cost by
banks when accepting transfers from each other.
III.
POLICY RESPONSES
The complexity of payments systems institutions,
to say nothing of the overdraft problem itself, makes
it critical that any policies instituted to control risk
be selected thoughtfully and deliberately. Using the
framework developed above, this section will analyze
five policy alternatives. Two of these, pricing and an
intraday funds market, explicitly rely on the price
system to reduce risks. Two others, banning daylight
overdrafts and placing restrictions on overdrafts,
explicitly reject price incentives. The fifth, finality
of payments, creates an assignment of liabilities
among parties to a transfer in order to provide incen-
tives to monitor risks. All five will be looked at in
terms of how they affect risk assignment, what incen-
tives they will create, and whether they may be
reasonably expected to attain their stated objectives.
Following this discussion, recent policy initiatives
from the Board of Governors will be described.
Analysis of Policy Alternatives
Ban daylight overdrafts.  As was pointed out in
the first section, daylight overdrafts on net settlement
systems actually refer to net debit positions. Since
if one or more parties on a net settlement network
are net creditors, then at least one other party must
be a net debtor. It follows that banning daylight
overdrafts on private networks would mean that a
bank could incur a debit only if it were receiving an
offsetting credit in return. Such a ban would, in all
likelihood, be so costly as to eliminate net settlement
systems entirely.
Daylight overdrafts could be banned on a gross
settlement network. If daylight overdrafts on Fed-
wire were totally forbidden, so that transfers could
only be made if banks had sufficient funds in their
reserve accounts to cover them, sender risk would
still exist to the extent that sending banks extend
FEDERAL RESERVE RANK OF RICHMOND 21overdraft credit to their sending customers. How-
ever, receiver risk to the public would be eliminated.
Thus, from a risk reduction standpoint, banning over-
drafts would be the most effective course of action,
at least as far as Fedwire is concerned. Unfortu-
nately, such a policy would be fraught with diffi-
culties.
Forbidding Fedwire overdrafts would be costly to
the banking system and its customers because trans-
fers would have to be held until covering funds were
provided, thus depriving institutions of flexibility in
making transfers. The results would be the intraday
analogue of forbidding short-term credit by which
businesses bridge gaps between payments and re-
ceipts. Of course, this is not to argue that the current
level of overdrafts is somehow optimal, but rather
that some overdrafts may be justified on efficiency
grounds.
19 If daylight overdrafts are permitted, how-
ever, there is no reason why they should be given
away as free credit.
From an operational standpoint, banning daylight
overdrafts would be costly if one were to insist on
“real time” (second-to-second) monitoring of Fed-
wire transfers in order to stop overdrafts before they
occurred. A less costly approach would be to monitor
transfers ex post and then to levy heavy penalties in
order to deter would-be violators. Finally, a strict
ban on daylight overdrafts on Fedwire could easily
be evaded by shifting transfers to one of the private
networks.
Establishment of an intraday credit market.  Day-
light overdrafts could eventually be banned if an
intraday Fed funds credit market were to evolve.
There, credit would be available for periods of less
than 24 hours, possibly by lending for four-hour
increments. If such a market existed, a sending bank
could make the decision whether to borrow in order
to send immediately or else to wait until covering
funds were on hand. This would preserve the flexi-
bility of the present system, but would shift risk to
intraday lenders rather than to the Fed. Further,
since risk would be borne by lenders only for a price,
the costs described above would be placed back on
19 
For example, it has been argued that banks in unit
banking states must depend on daylight overdrafts more
heavily than do banks in other states. (Chicago Clearing
House (1984), Appendix A) In addition, many over-
drafts are apparently the result of current practices of
banks buying and selling federal funds. To the extent
that these practices simply reflect institutional practices
that evolved as the result of permitting overdrafts, they
do not affect the arguments presented here.
those banks that incur them.
20 Most importantly,
since intraday credit would no longer be unpriced,
borrowers would have incentives to economize on
risks they incur. Since effects of such a system on
resource allocation are similar to pricing, further
discussion will be suspended until the following
section.
Pricing. An alternative perspective on the over-
draft problem can be obtained from the economics of
information and uncertainty.
21 Microeconomic theory
asserts that, given a choice between, say, receipt of
$200 for certain and a fifty percent chance of $1000,
a rational person may prefer the certain $200. In
other words, even if this person could expect to win
$500 in such a gamble on average, he may be willing
to give up some expected winnings in order to reduce
uncertainty. This behavior is referred to as risk
aversion, and one of its implications is that risk-
averse individuals are willing to pay to have uncer-
tainty reduced, that is, they are willing to buy
insurance at some price.
Assuming that the stockholders of banks partici-
pating in a payments network are risk-averse, it
follows that they would be willing to pay a positive
amount to have receiver risk reduced. In other
words, insurance of receiver risk is a valuable service
to banks. Thus, the Fed’s nonpriced guarantee of
Fedwire overdraft transfers is in effect a subsidy to
the stockholders and customers of participating
banks. The amount of the subsidy is not the actual
amount of overdrafts, but rather the premium that
bank owners would be willing to pay to have receiver
risk assumed by the insurer. If this insurance were
explicitly priced, not only would the subsidy be re-
covered but banks would have incentives to take
account of the risks they place on the payments
system. Thus, although credit risk would still be
assumed by the public, it would not be assumed for
free.
One advantage of pricing Fedwire overdrafts is
that it acknowledges that a certain amount of over-
drafting may be optimal insofar as it helps maintain
an “efficient” payments system that avoids a gridlock
in which the whole system becomes jammed due to
delayed transfers. Overdrafts could be monitored
on an ex post basis and then charged for, say, at the
end of the month. Banks would, as a result, be made
20 
Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow’s (1969) characterization of the
externality problem as “a special case of a more general
phenomenon, the failure of markets to exist.”
21 
See, for example, John D. Hey (1979).
22 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1985aware that they impose costs on the system, and thus
would have incentives to delay at least some transfers
until covering funds become available. In addition,
charges made on the basis of percentage of overdrafts
would bear some relation to risk exposure, certainly a
closer relationship than that found in the current
practice of charging a flat fee for wire transfers
regardless of overdraft position.
Pricing of overdrafts on Fedwire may also be
desirable from the standpoint of public policy regard-
ing competition between payments service providers.
Since Congress passed the Monetary Control Act of
1980, the Federal Reserve System has been placed in
the somewhat awkward position of both regulator and
competitor of private banks. Although the Act con-
tains no specific mention of “fair” competition with
the private sector, the legislative history of the Act
shows that Congress clearly was concerned with this
subject. In fact, some have recommended that the
Federal Reserve Act be amended to make such com-
petition an explicit objective of Fed policy.
22 Despite
the ambiguity of current law, however, the Board of
Governors has expressed its “fundamental commit-
ment to competitive fairness” and stated as a matter
of policy that “Federal Reserve actions are . . . imple-
mented in a manner that insures fairness to other
providers of payments services.“
23 Thus, since guar-
antee of settlement in the form of free intraday credit
constitutes a competitive advantage of Fedwire over
the private networks, pricing may help to stimulate
competition in the provision of payment services.
24
The major obstacle to implementing a pricing
scheme on Fedwire is that it is not obvious what the
appropriate price for either insurance or intraday
credit is. Risk premia most certainly exist in a world
of risk-averse individuals, but measuring such premia
would require data that are typically not available,
such as how much risk bank stockholders are willing
to tolerate and the probability of settlement failure
occurring. A market price for intraday credit does
exist in the form of the broker call rate charged bro-
kers for day loans, which are made so that a broker
can certify a check used to pay for securities. This
22 
See Raymond Natter, “Legislative Intent Regarding
Pricing of Services by the Federal Reserve Board” in
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives (1984), pp.
81-91; for the recommendation, see p. 8.
23 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(1984), pp. 710, 712.
24 
The Department of Justice has also expressed its con-
cern with such an advantage, and has suggested con-
sideration of pricing. See U. S. Department of Justice
(1984), pp. 7, 34-5.
rate tends to float about 100 basis points above the
Fed funds rate, and the loans are repaid by the end
of the day.
25 The main problem with this form of
pricing is that it charges a one-day rate whether the
actual loan lasts a few hours or the whole day. There
is no reason, however, why the rate could not be
computed for shorter periods. An alternative means
of pricing is to use the tax-adjusted difference be-
tween the rates on go-day bank certificates of deposit
and Treasury bills as an approximation of the price
of default risk.
26 The problem with this approach is
that this difference fluctuates widely, and disentan-
gling default risk from tax effects is likely to be a
formidable task.
27 As another alternative, over-
drafts could be charged the Fed funds rate extrap-
olated backwards to periods of less than 24 hours.
If such a rate is too high, then it is likely that an
intraday credit market would develop. If it is too
low, at least it will provide incentives in the desired
direction, that is, toward fewer overdrafts. Finally, a
price for overdrafts could be computed from the dis-
count rate. Since this rate is typically lower than the
Fed funds rate, it is less likely to lead to an intraday
funds market.
While pricing daylight overdrafts may be desirable
on Fedwire, it does not necessarily follow that net
debits on the private networks should be explicitly
priced as well. As pointed out above, if the Fed
stands ready to lend through the discount window in
order to prevent systemic failure due to illiquidity of
receiving banks, the costs incurred by the failed bank
will most likely be borne by the banks in net credit
positions against the failed bank. Since these costs
represent expected costs to participants in net settle-
ment networks, banks should take them into con-
sideration when deciding on risk exposures. Thus,
although explicit pricing of risks does not exist on
the private networks, there is implicit pricing so long
as banks expect the Fed to lend to net creditor banks
experiencing liquidity problems due to the failure of a
net debtor to settle. In addition, although the public
may bear some losses if one or more of the receiving
banks fails and is unable to repay borrowed funds,
the Fed is compensated for taking this risk because
interest is charged on discount window credit. The
main problem for policymakers is to ensure that
sufficient collateral is on hand to facilitate discount
25 
For a discussion of day loans, see Gardiner B. Van
Ness III (1975), pp. 143-52.
26 
Humphrey (1984), pp. 100-l.
27 
See Timothy Q. Cook and Thomas A. Lawler (1983).
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 23window lending should systemic failure be threat-
ened.
28
The existence of implicit pricing on the private
networks calls into question the assertion that certain
intervention by the lender of last resort creates a
“moral hazard,” that is to say, leads network partici-
pants to devote fewer resources to monitoring the
riskiness of sending banks than would otherwise have
been the case, thereby increasing the probability of
settlement failure.
29 For moral hazard to exist, how-
ever, it would be necessary for banks to be able to
shift the costs of their failure to monitor to other
banks. At least in the case of temporary illiquidity
of receiving banks, it is difficult to see how such cost
shifting could occur, since borrowers must pay back,
with interest, funds advanced by the Fed. Thus, if
banks are not observed to engage in extensive risk
monitoring, it may be due not to moral hazard but
rather to their perception of a very low probability of
settlement failure.
Finality of Payment.  As mentioned above, finality
exists on Fedwire but not on CHIPS or CashWire.
In essence, finality of payment establishes a strict
liability rule under which a receiving bank is made
liable for all payments it accepts. Regardless of
whether or not the receiving bank could have foreseen
the failure of a sending bank, the receiving bank
would  have no recourse to the receiver. The rationale
for such a condition is that overall costs would be
minimized by focusing them on the party to the
transaction who can reduce risks at lowest cost.
30 In
other words, the receiving bank is made to bear the
costs of a settlement failure because it is believed
that this party is in the best position to monitor and
avoid such costs. Although finality would not by
itself reduce risks, it has been justified as a means of
risk concentration that would in turn induce banks
to take risk reduction measures, thereby minimizing
costs to all parties.
31
28 
Institutions that do not have access to the discount
window could be required to collateralize all daylight
overdrafts, or else these institutions could be forbidden
overdrafts.
29 
Stevens (1984), p. 11.
30 
This corresponds to the “cheapest cost avoider” in
Guido Calabresi (1970), pp. 135-40.
31 
See Stevens (1984), pp. 10-11. Stevens also suggests
that a “hands-off” policy by the Fed toward settlement
failure would create incentives similar to those claimed
for finality.
It is possible, however, that the receiving bank
may not necessarily be in the best position to monitor
sending banks, since it would require each bank to
perform a credit evaluation of each participant in the
system. Although rating firms exist to evaluate
creditworthiness, it may be costly to obtain continu-
ally updated ratings. Thus, it may be preferable to
place some liability on senders and receivers as well.
There would be at least two advantages to such an
assignment. First, customers using large dollar
transfer networks to send funds are likely to possess
the sophistication to monitor the banks with whom
they deal. Second, they would, as customers, prob-
ably have fewer banks to monitor than would banks
participating in a funds transfer network.
If a sending bank fails before net settlement on a
network with no finality, a receiving bank that had
allowed a receiver to use funds before they were
finally received may now attempt to take back those
funds. If the attempt is successful, the receiver now
has reason to take action against the sender to re-
cover a payment. This exposes the sender to liability.
This is especially severe since that sender may have
actually provided funds to the failed sending bank.
If he had, then he must both attempt to recover from
the failed bank and also will be subject to action by
the receiver demanding payment. Thus, the sender
will have incentives to monitor the riskiness of the
sending bank he selects. At the same time, due to the
uncertainty of recovery from the receiver by the
receiving bank, there still will be incentive for this
bank to monitor the riskiness of sending banks.
Finality of payment, then, is justified only if it can
be shown to be the cost-minimizing assignment of
liabilities. If monitoring of sending banks is costly,
then it may be preferable to spread liability in order
to give other parties incentives to monitor. The
benefits of finality become even more dubious when
one considers that lack of recourse to transferred
funds may increase the probability of settlement
failure for a receiving bank, and thereby increase
systemic risk as well. Although finality may “insulate
the nonbank sector from the effects of a settlement
failure,“
32 it is not at all clear that it creates the
incentives that would minimize risks from a social
standpoint.
32 
49 Fed. Reg. 13190.
24 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1985Nonprice rationing of overdrafts.  Approaches to
payments system risk that ration daylight overdrafts
seek to control either a bank’s exposure to risk from
sending banks or else the amount of risk one bank
creates for the rest of the payments system. Indeed,
such measures have been recommended by private
sector studies.
33
Net bilateral credit  limits are drawn up by a re-
ceiving bank and specify the maximum net transfer
the bank will receive from a particular sending
bank.
34 By limiting the size of a net transfer, expo-
sure of a receiving bank to a sending bank is kept
within bounds. Since failure of a sending bank would
inflict costs on a receiving bank, it is likely that, if
bilateral limits were an effective risk reduction mea-
sure, banks would institute them. Further, if finality
of payment were imposed on a system, receivers may
have greater incentives to establish bilateral limits.
Indeed, all private payments systems now have such
limits in place.
35 However, such a measure is not
without problems.
The most serious problem with bilateral credit
limits is, as in the case of finality, the cost of making
judgments about individual banks in order to set
actual limits. Judgments would include determining
for which banks to set limits, gathering information,
analyzing information, and updating the limits as
conditions change. Since many banks would be faced
with large numbers of judgments to make, some sort
of categorization may be necessary in order to obvi-
ate a separate study for each sending bank. However,
this would involve a loss of detailed information,
which would in turn make the resulting bilateral
limits less useful.
A second problem with net credit limits is that
they, like most nonprice rationing schemes, tend to
be inflexible and therefore costly. Suppose a receiver
is expecting a payment over a private network, but
that the payment exceeds the receiving bank’s net
credit limit. If limits were rigid and could not be
easily modified, they would preclude the bank from
accepting the payment, even if there were no doubt as
to the sending bank’s solvency.
36 In actual practice,
33 
See, for example, Association of Reserve City Bankers
(1983), pp. 23-25.
34 
49 Fed. Reg. 13189.
35 
CHIPS was the last system to institute bilateral net
credit limits. American Banker, December 5, 1984.
36 
A likely response is to divide the payment between two
networks.
however, limits can be lifted to cover such situations,
The result is that flexibility is preserved but the value
of the limits as a risk reduction tool may be called
into question.
The third problem with bilateral limits is inti-
mately related to the second. If limits are set at rela-
tively low levels, they may reduce risks but may also
send business over to Fedwire, where no such limits
exist. This problem would be even more acute if
finality were imposed on private networks. Thus,
the problem of competitive equity between public and
private networks again rears its head.
Net debit caps  attempt to control the risk a bank
poses to the banking system by limiting the amount
by which a bank may be “in the red” on a network
or across networks.
37 Such a measure should be
effective for reducing both receiver risk and systemic
risk. Unfortunately, such caps have the same disad-
vantages of inflexibility as do net credit limits, al-
though they do not involve as costly a set of infor-
mation requirements to implement. In addition, since
net debit caps would control costs external to indi-
vidual banks, it is unlikely that these banks have
strong incentives to establish binding caps that are
likely to limit risks to acceptable levels, Thus, such
caps, if adopted, would probably have to be developed
by a collective effort of banks or, failing that, imposed
by regulatory fiat.
Net bilateral credit limits and net debit caps may
be characterized as measures which limit risks by
limiting the choices of banks without altering the
underlying incentive structure. In other words,
neither may be expected to affect risk assignments
among network participants, but rather to control
the amount of risk assumed. Because both may
prevent some transfers from taking place, they are
likely to reduce risks in the short run. Over the long
run, net bilateral credit limits are likely to prove
useful to banks as means of controlling exposure to
other banks in the system. However, it may be in
some institutions’ interests to find ways to circum-
vent such restrictions as net debit caps, thereby
short-circuiting risk control policies. For that reason,
it may be necessary in the future to institute addi-
tional policies that more directly affect the incentives
of payments network participants.
37 
49 Fed. Reg. 13188. CashWire has net debit caps of
50 percent of capital, while CHIPS is experimenting
with a more complex system of caps.
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As mentioned above, all private networks now
have bilateral net credit limits in place. In October
1984, the Association of Reserve City Bankers
(ARCB) Risk Control Task Force issued a report
outlining a procedure for setting up a voluntary
system of net debit caps.
38
The caps would work as follows. Financial insti-
tutions would evaluate themselves in the areas of
creditworthiness, operational controls and procedures,
and credit controls. The ratings in these three areas
will then be combined in order to give an overall
rating-exceptional, satisfactory, or less than satis-
factory. The rating would determine whether a bank
would be permitted to overdraft across systems up to
2.5, 2, or 1.5 times capital, respectively. However,
the limit would not apply to individual overdrafts but
rather to the average maximum overdraft over a two-
week reserve period. Finally, the caps would be
applied across: all wholesale EFT networks, including
Fedwire.
In May 1985, the Board of Governors met to dis-
cuss risk reduction measures. Generally, they agreed
with the ARCB recommendations, but instituted two
major changes to the net debit cap system.
39 First,
in addition to a cap on average maximum overdrafts,
banks will be asked to set higher caps on maximum
daily overdrafts. Controls will be applied by banks
to both average overdraft size and how much these
overdrafts will be allowed to vary from the average.
Second, average caps were reduced by fifty percent
of capital for each rating category, so that a bank
rating itself in the highest range could not overdraft
more than twice its capital. The Board also added a
fourth, lowest category, the members of which could
not overdraft at all.
The regulators’ role in this self-regulatory mecha-
nism would be for examiners to review the self-
evaluations and to point out areas of disagreement.
Such a role is actually compatible with a results-
oriented approach to regulation, in which specific ob-
jectives are established by regulators but implementa-
tion is left to the regulated industry. The older,
alternative approach would be for the regulator to
require specific actions to accomplish the objectives.
This latter approach would only be brought into play
if the former approach fails.
38 
Association of Reserve City Bankers (1984).
39 
50 Fed. Reg. 21120 (1985). In addition, networks
requesting net settlement services from the Fed will be
required to institute bilateral net credit limits.
IV.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
On its surface, the risk reduction problem has all
the earmarks of the economic problem of collective
action, that is, actions that are in the interest of
depository institutions as a whole are not necessarily
in their interests as individuals. If this accurately
describes the situation with regard to systemic risk,
then the current “voluntary action in lieu of regula-
tion” solution is warranted. Because the alternative
to voluntary action is more stringent imposed regu-
latory solution, the banking industry may well have
incentives to attempt to reduce overdrafts by means
of a self-regulatory mechanism.
However, this article has attempted to demonstrate
that while the problem is complex, the solution need
not be. On Fedwire, risk is being assumed by the
public because intraday credit is granted free of
charge to participating depository institutions. Thus,
some sort of pricing of overdrafts or an intraday
funds market may be called for. Even with pricing,
Fedwire would continue to be in demand because it,
unlike the private networks, provides immediate
transfer of funds, On the private networks, however,
pricing is not called for because risks are borne by
participating banks. If the Fed lends to receiving
banks through the discount window in order to pre-
vent a systemic failure, the borrowing institutions
will bear the cost, and may be expected to take this
cost into account in their credit decisions. Further,
even without finality of payment, it appears that costs
due to settlement failure are assigned to parties that
have incentives to monitor, should they perceive the
potential for losses to be significant. All that is
required is a commitment by the lender of last resort
to supply net creditor banks the necessary liquidity
to prevent a settlement failure from becoming a
systemic failure, and the proper collateralization to
insure that lending can proceed.
Recently, the Board of Governors has established a
risk reduction policy for large dollar transfer net-
works. Although this policy relies largely on non-
price risk control measures, the Board made it clear
that it intends as a matter of long-term policy “to
reduce further the volume and incidence of daylight
overdrafts and other uses of intraday credit.“
40 As
experience is gained with risk control policies, it may
be desirable in the future to consider measures that
provide additional economic incentives for banks to
take account of risks they create.
40 
Ibid., p. 21121.
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